Tort Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults by Case, David R.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 10
1977 
Tort Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults 
David R. Case 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Legislation Commons, 
and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David R. Case, Tort Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 517 (1977). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol10/iss3/7 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
TORT LIABILITY OF LABOR UNIONS 
FOR PICKET LINE ASSAULTS 
In the tense and volatile atmosphere that accompanies labor 
disputes, no situation is more likely to produce violence than the 
picket line. The confrontation of antagonistic parties at the picket 
line enhances the possibility of personal assaults. Although as-
saults by pickets will usually be unfair labor practices,1 the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 does not provide a 
mechanism for fully compensating the victims of such assaults. 3 In 
addition, those who commit picket line assaults will often be 
judgment-proof. 4 Thus, in order to secure adequate compensation 
for their injuries, the victims of picket line assaults must be able to 
attach tort liability to labor unions. 5 
This article will discuss whether tort actions against unions for 
picket line assaults are preempted by the National Labor Relations 
Act, and if not preempted, what forums are available to hear such 
actions. This article will also examine the theories that have been 
used to hold unions liable for the assaults committed by their 
picketers. Included in this discussion will be an analysis of the 
policy considerations offered in support of the various theories of 
liability. 
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND CHOICE OF FORUM 
Three potential forums are available for the adjudication of labor 
relations disputes: the state courts, the federal courts, and the 
. · 
1 Section 8 (b)(l)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice 
for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or·coerce an employee attempting to exercise 
his section 7 rights to organize, bargain collectively through agents of his own choosing, or 
to.refrain from such concerted activity. 29 U. S.C. § 158(b)( l)(A) (1970). The National Labor 
Relations Board has found picket line assaults to be a violation of section 8 (b)(l)(A). 
Teamsters Local 783 [Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Louisville], 160 N.L.R.B, 1776 (1966); 
Local 888, UAW [Miami Plating Co.], 144 N.L.R.B. 897 (1%3). 
2 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-168 (1970). 
3 The National Labor Relations Act only grants the National Labor Relations Board the 
power to make an award of back pay, not damages for pain and suffering. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) 
(1970). See also UAW-CIO v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. 
Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). 
4 J3 MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 282 (1975). 
• The tort liability of labor unions for picket line assaults is discussed in Evans, The Law 
of Agency and the National Unions, 49 KY. L.J. 295 (1961); Myers, State Damage Suit by 
an Employer Against a. Labor Union for Injuries Incurred Through Violence During a 
Strike, 34 TENN. L. REv. 609 (1967); Comment, The Liability of Labor Unions for Picket 
Line Assaults, 21 U .C.L.A.L. REv. 600 (1973). 
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National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 6 the Supreme Court held that where 
the "activity is arguably subject" to section 7 or 8 of the National 
Labor Relations Act, the state and federal courts "must defer to 
the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations 
Board. " 7 The Court reasoned that unless the National Labor Rela-
tions Board had exclusive jurisdiction over questions of labor 
policy, the multiplicity of tribunals would produce incompatible 
rules and frustrate the development of a national labor policy. 8 
Furthermore, the Court discerned a congressional intent to entrust 
the administration of a national labor policy to a centralized ad-
ministrative agency equipped with special procedures and exper-
tise concerning labor relations problems.9 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized several excep-
tions to this preemption doctrine. 10 Most notably, the Court has 
consistently allowed state courts tq adjudicate tort claims arising 
from violence incident to labor disputes.11 Originally, the Court 
justified this exception by focusing on the inability of the NLRB to 
provide adequate remedies for the victims of labor violence. 12 
More recently, the Garmon Court based the exemption of violent 
conduct from preemption on the kind of conduct involved, rather 
than the kind of relief being sought. 13 The Court stressed the 
states' overriding interest in the maintenance of public order14 and 
noted that labor violence touches interests deeply rooted in local 
feelings and responsibilities .15 Subsequent decisions have reaf-
firmed this justification for exempting labor violence from federal 
preemption. 16 Thus, although picket line assaults are "arguably" 
6 359 u .s. 236 (1959). 
7 Id. at 245. 
8 Id. at 242-45. 
9 Id. at 242. 
10 The Court has held that state courts may hear libel suits, Linn v. United Plant Guard 
Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), claims for alleged breach of a collective bargaining 
agreement, Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), and claims for breach of a 
bargaining representative's duty of fair representation, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
For a discussion of the preemption doctrine, see generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption 
Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337 (1972); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent 
Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 CoLUM. L. REv. 469 (1972). 
11 See Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 
(1959); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. 
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). 
12 See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1956); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum 
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). See also note 3 supra. 
13 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1958). 
1
• Id. at 247. 
15 Id. at 244. 
16 Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
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subject to section 8 of the NLRA, 17 states are not preempted from 
adjudicating tort claims arising from picket line violence. 
The availability of the federal judiciary as an alternative forum 
requires satisfaction of certain jurisdictional requirements. Since 
unions are considered citizens of the states where their members 
reside, 18 federal diversity jurisdiction is unlikely. Yet the federal 
courts might be able to exercise pendent jurisdiction19 over tort 
claims resulting from picket line assaults. The federal courts have 
exercised pendent jurisdiction over state tort claims resulting from 
union violence when these tort claims have arisen from the same 
nucleus of operative facts as a suit under section 303 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act,20 the provision dealing with secondary 
boycotts. In these cases, the individual who had suffered harm 
from the economic pressures of the secondary boycott had also 
suffered property damage from union violence. 21 Similarly, if an 
individual who brought a section 303 suit for damage ·resulting from 
a secondary boycott was also assaulted during that boycott, a 
federal court is capable of exercising pendent jurisdiction over the 
state tort claim for the picket line assault. Since pendent jurisdic-
tion is discretionary, even if this unlikely situation should occur, a 
federal court would not necessarily have to assume jurisdiction 
over the state tort claim.22 Thus, tort actions for picket line as-
saults will usually be adjudicated in state courts. 23 
II. THEORIES FOR IMPOSING TORT LIABILITY ON UNIO.NS 
A. Conspiracy 
At common law labor unions had no existence as legal entities 
independent of their members. 24 Consequently, the courts based 
17 See note I supra. See also note 6 and accompanying text supra. 
18 United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965). 
19 In UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), the Court held that the federal courts may 
exercise pendent jurisdiction whenever the state and federal claims "derive from a common 
nucleus of operative facts," and are such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to 
try them all in one judicial proceeding." The Court further noted that pendent jurisdiction is 
discretionary. Id. ;.t 726-27 (1966). 
20 Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act allows a person injured by a 
secondary boycott to bring suit for damages in a federal district court or any court having 
jurisdiction over the parties. 29 U .S.C. § 187 (1970). 
21 See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1969). 
22 See· note 19 supra. The reluctance of federal courts to make needless decisions of state 
determinations of law would militate against pendent jurisdiction. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 
715, 726 (1966). The federal courts would be especially reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over 
tort actions for picket line'assaults since the state has a special interest in the adjudication of 
these actions. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra. 
23 See Comment, The Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults, 21 U.C.LA. L. 
REv. 600, 606-08 (1973). 
24 Walker v. Locomotive Engineers, 186 Ga. 811, 199 S.E .. 146 (1938); Karges Furniture 
Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local 131. 165 Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877 (1905); St. Paul 
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union liability for picket line assaults on the theory that all mem-
bers of a union. were engaged in a civil conspiracy. 25 Since unions 
can now be sued as unincorporated associations in most jurisidic-
tions,26 courts rarely rely upon this theory today, although it is still 
used occasionally in attempts to hold unions liable for picket line 
violence.27 
B. Consent 
Courts commonly rely upon a theory of consent to hold unions 
liable for picket line assaults committed by their members.28 Under 
this theory, unions are responsible for actions they authorize or 
ratify. 29 There are two distinct standards for imposing liability on 
unions under this theory. 
1. The Norris-La Guardia Test-Section 6 of the Norris-La 
Guardia Act provides that unions may not be held responsible for 
the unlawful acts of their members without clear proof of actual 
union participation in, authorization for, or ratification of such 
acts. 30 By requiring "clear proof' and "actual" participation, 
authorization, or ratification, this section establishes stringent 
criteria for imposing liability on unions for the acts of their mem-
bers. Derived from the Coronado Coal Cases, 31 this test was 
incorporated into the Norris-La Guardia Act in order to protect 
unions from being weakened by damage judgments resulting from 
events beyond their control.32 
Xypothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders Union, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N.W. 725 (1905). See 
generally Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation, 
51 YALE L.J. 40 (1941). 
25 A civil conspiracy is typically defined as a combination between two or more persons to 
accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. Koehring Co. v. National Automatic Tool 
Co., 257 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Ind. 1966). McKee v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455; 181 S.W. 930 
(1915). See also Burdick, The Tort Conspiracy as a Crime, And Conspiracy as a Tort, 7 
CoLUM. L. REV. 229 (1907); Charlesworth, Conspiracy as a Ground of Liability in Tort, 36 
L.Q. REv. 38 (1920). For a decision applying the conspiracy theory to a picket line asault, 
see Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1955). 
26 Myers, State Damage Suit by an Employer Against a Labor Union for Injuries lncu"ed 
Through Violence During a Strike, 34 TENN. L. REv. 609, 622 (1967). 
27 See, e.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
28 Evans, The Law of Agency and the National Union, 49 KY. L.J. 295, 300-04 (1961). 
2
• Id. at 300. 
30 29 u.s.c. § 106 (1970). 
31 Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1924); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 
U.S. 344 (1922). In determining whether the plaintiff corporation could recover treble 
damages under section 7 of the Sherman Act for a union conspiracy to restrain interstate 
commerce, the Court stated that the international union would be liable for strike violence 
only if it "was shown by substantial evidence to have initiated, participated in, or ratified the 
interference with plaintiff's business." 259 U.S. at 393'. The Court found no "substantial 
evidence" of union involvement despite the fact that the union president and the union 
journal reported acts of union violence without criticism. 
32 UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 737 (1966); S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., !st Sess. 19 
(1932). 
SPRING 1977] Union Liability for Picket Assaults 521 
In an early decision, the Supreme Court held that the standard 
enunciated in section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act applied to 
both national and local unions. 33 Subsequently, in UMW v. 
Gibbs, 34 the Supreme Court held that this standard should be used 
in federal court adjudications of state tort claims arising out of 
labor disputes.35 The Court reasoned that this standard was neces, 
sary to keep unions from being destroyed financially by the puni-
tive damage remedies available in many states. 36 Although the 
federal courts have never applied the Norris-La Guardia standard 
to tort claims for picket line assaults,37 they have applied this 
standard to tort claims for property damage resulting from picket 
line violence.38 
Under section 6, unions may be held liable for violent conduct 
which they have actually authorized or ratified. To find "actual" 
authorization or ratification, however, the courts require proof of 
actual participation by the union or its agents in the violent con-
duct. In Ritchie v. UMW, 39 unidentified saboteurs had dynamited 
the entrance to a coal mine during a strike. Although UMW offi-
cials had stated that such violence would stop if the employers 
signed· a contract, the court held that this was not an actual au-
thorization or ratification under section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia 
Act. In Riverside Coal Company v. UMW, 40 however, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found actual authorization where a UMW 
district representative, present during the violence, led the picket-
ing and made repeated threats of violence to police officers and 
nonunion workers. Hence, Ritchie and Riverside Coal suggest 
that unions will not be held liable under the courts' interpretation 
of the Norris-La Guardia standard unless there is actual participa-
tion by the union or its agents in the union violence. 
To prevail under section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, the 
plaintiff must establish by "clear proof' the requisite union par-
33 United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 407-09 (1947). 
3 '.383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
35 The Court rejected the argument that the provisions of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (L.M.R.A.) should govern in these situations. The L.M.R.A. provides that 
ordinary concepts of agency determine union responsibility for the acts of their members. 29 
U .S.C. §§ 152(13), 185(e), 187(b) (1970). Noting that Congress did not repeal section 6 of the 
Norris-La Guardia Act when it enacted the L.~.R.A., the Court discerned a congressional 
intent to limit the L.M.R.A. standard to the situations covered by the L.M.R.A. 383 U.S. at 
736. For a discussion of the L.M.R.A. standard, see notes 62-67 and accompanying text 
infra. 
36 383 U.S. at 736. 
37 The difficulty of obtaining federal jurisdiction over picket line assaults probably ac-
counts for the lack of cases. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra. 
38 UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 ~1966); Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1969); 
Riverside Coal Co. v. UMW, 410 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1969); Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 
806 (6th Cir. 1968); Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Textile Workers Union, 347 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1972). 
39 410 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1969). 
•
0 410 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1969). 
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ticipation.41 In UMW v. Gibbs, 42 the Court interpreted the clear 
proof standard to require that the plaintiff present "clear, un-
equivocal and convincing proof," and to persuade by more than a 
bare preponderance of evidence. Thus, this standard requires less 
than the criminal burden of proof but more than the "ordinary civil 
burden of persuasion. " 43 Although "clear proof' is a demanding 
standard, the courts have indicated that this standard may be 
satisfied by circumstantial evidence44 or by an analysis of union 
customs and traditions. 45 
Some states have "little Norris-La Guardia Acts" which also 
require "clear proof' of actual participation, authorization, or 
ratification to hold unions liable for picket line violence. 46 Several 
state courts have held that their statutes apply only to injunctive 
actions, not to damage actions. 47 In Benoit v. Local 299, United 
Electrical Radio & Machine Workers, 48 however, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that the state's "little Norris-La Guardia Act" 
encompassed tort actions for picket line violence. The court nar-
rowly construed the Norris-La Guardia standard, finding that a 
union did not authorize or ratify a picket line assault committed by 
two union officials. 49 In a later decision, however, the Connecticut 
court held that an international and local union were liable under 
this standard where several leading union officials repeatedly par-
ticipated in strike violence, planned strike activities, and refused to 
repudiate violent tactics. 50 Apparently only such overwhelming 
evidence of union participation was sufficient to satisfy the Con-
necticut court's interpretation of the Norris-La Guardia standard. 
The purpose of the Norris-La Guardia test was to protect unions, 
especially from large punitive damage judgments for acts of vio-
lence in which they had not actually participated.51 It is question-
able, however, whether unions need this kind of protection any 
longer, for unions have developed to the point where they should 
41 29 u .s.c. § 106 (1970). 
42 383 U.S. 715,737 (1966). 
43 Id. The Court defined the "ordinary civil burden of persuasion" as persuasion by a 
preponderance of evidence. Id. 
44 Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1969). 
45 United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947). 
46 Many of these acts have tenninology similar to the Norris-La Guardia Act. See, e.g., 
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-114 (West 1965). 
47 See, e.g., Titus v. Tacoma Smeltennen's Local 25, 62 Wash. 2d 461, 383 P.2d 504 
(1963); Nelson v. Haley, 232 Ind. 314, Ill N.E.2d 812 (1953). 
48 150 Conn. 266, 188 A.2d 499 (1963). 
49 Id. at 275, 188 A.2d at 503. 
50 United Aircraft Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 285 A.2d 330 
(1971). 
51 See note 32 supra. Congress also enacted the Norris-La Guardia Act with a view to 
protecting unions from injunctions. A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 5 
(1960). 
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accept "ordinary responsibility" for tort damages.52 To argue that 
the Norris-La Guardia standard is needed to protect unions from 
punitive damages reflects a distrust of the courts' ability to limit the 
imposition of punitive damages to appropriate situations. Even if 
this distrust is warranted, the better solution would be to eliminate 
punitive damages, rather than to limit the union's responsibility for 
the violent conduct of its members. 
· In addition, the Norris-La Guardia test fails to serve other im-
portant policies. Specifically, the test places a heavy burden upon 
plaintiffs, making it difficult for them to receive compensation. 
Furthermore, the test is difficult to define and administer53 and 
tr.erefore encourages litigation. Besides burdening judicial re-
sources, this leaves parties uncertain as to their rights and respon-
sibilities. 
2. Implied Consent-Most state courts have relied upon a theory 
of "implied consent" to hold both local and international unions 
liable for picket line assaults.54 This theory does not demand the 
"clear proof" required by the Norris-La Guardia standard. 
Moreover, under this doctrine the courts may imply ratification or 
a1:1thorization from union silence or omissions regarding acts of 
violence. 55 
State courts have found that local unions had impliedly con-
sented to picket line assaults in a variety of situations. A South 
Carolina court found that a local union ratified an assault when it 
arranged bail and paid the fine of a member who committed the 
assault and failed to expel the picketers who threatened the vic-
tim.56 Similarly, a California court found that a local union ratified 
an assault when it failed to expel the member who perpetrated the 
assault. 5 7 Furthermore, a Tennessee court held that a local union 
authorized an assault because its officers were present during the 
assault and apparently encouraged it, even though they did not 
participate directly in the violence.58 
52 See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966). 
53 The "clear proof' standard is an unfamiliar concept to most courts, and has only been 
vaguely defined by a listing of synonyms. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra. 
54 Coats v. Construction & Gen'l Laborers Local 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 93 Cal. Rptr. 
639 (1971); McDaniel v. Textile Workers, 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S.W.2d I (1962); Hall v. 
Walters. 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1955). 
55 Coats v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Local 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 93 Cal. Rptr. 
639 (1971). 
56 Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729 (1955), cert. denied, 349 u:s. 953 (1955). 
57 Coats v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Local 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 93 Cal. Rptr. 
639 (1971). 
58 McDaniel v. Textile Workers. 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S. W.2d 1 (1962). Just before the 
assault. the individuals who committed the assaults communicated by telephone with the 
business representative of the union. The business representative said, "you know what our 
plans are, and you are to carry them out. Keep 'em in until they come out, and when they 
come out the gate thin 'em out." Id. at 250, 254 S.W.2d at 7. 
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State- courts have also -held international unions liable under an 
implied consent theory. A Tennessee court found ,that an interna-
. tional union ratified an assault when some of its officials were on 
the scene during the assault, and furnished bail money and attor-
neys to the members charged with the assaults. 59 MoreoveT, sev-
eral courts have relied upon an implied consent theory to hold 
international unions liable for assaults after finding that the local 
unions which authorized or ratified the picket line violence were 
acting as agents of the intemationals.60 To determine whether the 
local unions were acting as agents for the international, the courts 
examined the union constitutions to discover the extent of the 
intemational's control over local officers,61 their ability to suspend 
local charters, 62 and their ability to put locals in trusteeship. 63 
In determining whether unions have committed unfair labor 
practices, the NLRB must often decide whether picket line vio-
lence should be imputed to labor unions. Section '2(13) of the 
National Labor Relations Act .requires that the ·National Labor 
Relations Board apply the ordinary law of agency to this issue. 64 
According to the Board's interpretation, union consent can be 
inferred from conduct or acquiescence. 65 The Board has frequently 
found implied consent where a union failed to indicate disapproval 
of coercive acts of which it had knowledge, or where it took no 
steps to prevent further acts of violence. 66 
In suits to enforce NLRB orders, the federal courts have inter-
preted section 2(13) to allow imputing the violence of a strike 
participant to the union only where there is a showing of agency, 
ratification, counseling, incitement, or some other form of union 
participation in the violence.67 This approach appears to place 
59 UAW v. American Metal Prods. Co., 56 Tenn. App. 526,408 S.W.2d 682 (1964). Two 
federal cases applying Tennessee agem;y law held international unions liable because their 
agents directed local violence.'White Oak Coal Co. v. UMW, 381 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1963), 
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 966 (1964); UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F:2d 52 (6th Cir. 
1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959). 
60 International Union of Operating Engineers: Local 675 v. Lassiter, 295 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 
App. 1975); Overnite Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 257 N.C. 18, 125 
S.E.2d 277 (1962). 
61 International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 675 v. Lassiter, 295 So. 2d 634, 638 
(1975). 
62 Id. 
63 Overnite Ttansp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 257 N.C. 18, 26, 125 S.E.2d 
277, 283 (1962). 
64 29 u;s.c. § 152(13) (1970). 
65 As the National Labor Relations Board found, "Agency is a contractual relationship, 
deriving from the mutual consent of principal and agent that the agent shall act for the 
principal. But the principal's consent, technically called authorization or ratification, may be 
manifested by conduct, sometimes even by passive acquiescence as well as by words." 
Sunset Line & Twine Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1508 (1948) (italics omitted). 
66 See Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Worlcers, 222 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1976); Dairy Em-
ployees Local. 695, 221 N:L.R.B. 647 (1975) . 
. 67 See, e.g.; N.L.R.B. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 356 F.2d 995, 966 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 900 (1966). . 
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greater emphasis on the commission of some positive act, but by 
interpreting the ratification concept broadly the federal courts have 
applied the section 2(13) test in the same manner as the Board. For 
example, in Compton v. Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild, Local 
225, 68 the court held that a union directing a strike is responsible 
for the acts of its pickets if a union agent has established a pattern 
of coercive conduct which the strikers are expected to follow, or if 
a union agent receives knowledge of coercive acts being committed 
by pickets and does nothing to indicate disapproval or prevent the 
further commission of such acts.69 Nevertheless, isolated acts of 
violence have not been imputed to a union merely because the 
perpetrator of the violence was a union picket. 70 
The implied consent test occupies an intermediate position be-
tween the Norris-La Guardia standard and that of respondeat 
superior. 71 The implied consent standard imposes a lesser burden 
on plaintiffs than the Norris-La Guardia standard, for under the 
implied consent test plantiffs need not persuade the factfinder by 
"clear proof," but can show union consent through union acquies-
cence or inaction. As a result, this test enables more plaintiffs to 
receive compensation. The implied consent test, however, does 
not subject unions to unlimited liability, since under the test unions 
are not liable for isolated picket line assaults with which they have 
no actual connection. 72 Finally, this test is easy to administer 
because the NLRB has developed a well-defined body of case law 
dealing with union responsibility for picket line violence under the 
implied consent test. 73 
C. Respondeat Superior 
Under the theory of respondeat superior a master is liable for 
damages caused by the torts of his servants which are performed in 
the scope of their employment, regardless of the master's authori-
zation or ratification of the misconduct. 74 To impose liability on the 
basis of respondeat superior, the plaintiff must show both that a 
master-servant relationship existed and that the servant was acting 
within the scope of his employment when the misconduct occur-
red. 75 Though the length of the servant's employment, the method 
68 343 F. Supp. 884 (D.P.R. 1972). 
69 Id. at 889. 
70 See N.L.R.B. v. Service Employees, Local 254, 535 F.2d 1335 (1st Cir. 1976). 
11 See notes 72-93 and accompanying text infra. 
72 See note 70 and accompanying text supra. 
73 See generally Evans, The Law of Agency and the National Union, 49 KY. L.J. 295, 300 
(1961). 
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 216 (1958). 
75 International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 675 v. Lassiter. 295 So. 2d 634 
(1974); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Humphreys, 203 Va. 781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962); 
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of payment, the nature of the servant's activities, and the master's 
power of dismissal are all considered in establishing the master-
servant relationship,76 the master's right to control physical con-
duct of the servant is the most significant. 77 The scope of employ-
ment may be defined in several ways. A servant acting improperly 
may be acting within the scope of his employment when his acts 
are so closely connected with or incidental to his duties that they 
carry out the object of the employment. 78 Under a broader defini-
tion, a servant acts within the scope of his employment if his 
conduct is not so unforeseeable that it would be unfair to charge 
the master with responsibility. 79 Liability under respondeat 
superior is usually justified on the ground that it spreads the vic-
tim's loss throughout society80 and that it promotes the efficient 
allocation of economic resources. 81 
Several state courts have recognized that unions may be liable 
for picket line assaults under a theory of respondeat superior. 82 
These courts have found that the pickets were servants of their 
local83 or their international union. 84 The issue that separates these 
courts is whether the assaults were committed within the picket's 
scope of employment. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. 
Humphreys, 85 the court held that two pickets were acting within 
the scope of their employment when they left the picket line, 
pursued the plaintiff in an automobile and finally assaulted him at a 
service station. The court stated that an act is within the scope of a 
servant's employment whenever the act is "fairly and naturally" 
incident to the master's business and is done with a view to further 
the master's interests or from some "emotion which naturally grew 
Langness v. Katoner, 42 Wash. 2d 394, 255 P.2d 551 (1953); Hiroshima v. Pacific Gas & 
Elec. Co., 18 Cal. App 2d 24, 63 P. 2d 340 (1936). 
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958). 
77 Id. at§ 220, Comment d. On the difficulty of distinguishing a servant from an indepen-
dent contractor, see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220, Comments c-m 
(1958). 
78 w. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS§ 70, at 460-61 (4th ed. 1971). 
79 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). 
80 Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 CoLUM. L. REY. 444 (1923). 
81 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 
(1961). 
82 Titus v. Tacoma Smelterrnen's Local 25, 62 Wash. 2d. 461,383 P.2d 461 (1963); United 
Bhd. of Carpenters v. Humphreys, 203 Va. 781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962); Tulsa-Gen. Drivers 
Local 523 v. Conley, 288 P.2d 750 (Okla. 1955). 
83 Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Local 25, 62 Wash. 2d 461, 383 P.2d 461 (1963); Tulsa 
Gen. Drivers Local 523 v. Conley, 288 P.2d 750 (Okla. 1955). 
84 United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Humphreys, 203 Va. 781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962). Although 
the courts are not explicit as to why a picketer is a servant of the union, the unions' rights to 
control the pickets and the picketers' receipt of strike benefits are probably crucial elements 
in courts' determinations. For a discussion of picketers as union servants, see generally, 
Comment, The Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 600 
(1973). 
85 203 Va. 781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962). 
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out of or was incident to the attempt to perform the master's 
business. " 86 In contrast, the court in Tulsa General Drivers Local 
523 v. Conley 81 held that a picket was not acting within the scope of 
employment· when he followed the plaintiff several blocks away 
from the picket line and assaulted him. The court declared that 
only acts similar or incident to the conduct authorized were within 
a servant's scope of employment.88 
Since most picket line assaults arise from emotions generated by 
the strike, the union will often be subject to liability under the 
Humphreys test. Only when an assault arises out of strictly per-
sonal malice would a union escape liability under this standard. 
Indeed, it has even been proposed that the personal malice excep-
tion should be abolished when a plaintiff is seeking recovery from 
labor unions for picket line violence. 89 In effect, this would make 
unions the insurer of all picket line assaults. The broad construc-
tion given by the Humphreys court to "scope of employment" is 
inconsistent with the Conley court's construction. The Conley 
court limits the "scope of employment" to acts which are similar 
or incident to authorized conduct. Accordingly, the union must 
authorize some sort of violent activity if it is to be held liable for 
picket line assaults. This standard is similar to the implied consent 
test which holds unions liable for picket line assaults when the 
unions have established a violent course of conduct that pickets are 
expected to follow. 
Respondeat superior as applied by the Humphreys court is at-
tractive because the victim of almost every picket line assault 
could obtain compensation. It has been argued that labor unions 
can spread the cost of compensating assault victims "backward" 
to their membership by increasing· union dues, and could also 
spread this loss "forward" by demanding higher wages, thus in-
creasing the prices of goods to reflect fully the costs of produc-
tion.90 This in tum would promote a more effjcient allocation of 
economic resources.91 
86 The court observed that a servant's act is within the scope of his employment if: 
(I) it be something fairly and naturally incident to the business, and if (2) it be done 
while the servant was engaged upon the master's business and be done, although 
mistakenly or ill-advisedly, with a view to further the master's interests, or from 
some impulse or emotion which naturally grew out of or was incident to the attempt 
to perform the master's business, and did not arise wholly from some external, 
independent, and personal motive on the part of the servant to do the act upon his 
own account. 
Id. at 787, 127 S.E.2d at 103 (italics omitted). 
87 288 P.2d 750 (Okla. 1955). 
88 Id. at 753. 
89 Comment. The Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults. 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 
600, 622 (1973). 
90 Id. at 619-20. 
91 For an explanation of the role of respondeat superior in promoting the efficient alloca-
tion of economic resources, see generally Calabresi, supra note 81. 
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It is doubtful, however, whether labor unions are effective loss-
spreading institutions. Unions cannot spread their loss backward 
to the membership to any great degree because the union leader-
ship must look toward reelection, and thus is under pressure not to 
increase dues. Moreover, increased dues may jeopardize union 
viability by encouraging workers to quit the union and either seek 
membership in competing unions or choose against union member-
ship altogether. In addition, unions will not be able to spread the 
loss forward to employers by increased wage demands because 
employers will be reluctant to increase wages to pay for the costs 
of union violence .. 
Finally, although respondeat superior compensates victims, the 
cost may be too heavy. The role of labor unions in the American 
economic system has been recognized by legislatures and courts.92 
Tort actions for picket line assaults subject unions to damage suits 
where potentially destructive punitive damage awards can be 
made.93 Holding a union liable where picketers have committed no 
acts from which the consent of the union can be implied is too high 
a price to pay for victim compensation. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The potential for picket line violence is great. When an indi-
vidual is assaulted by picketers, often his only means of gaining 
compensation is to bring a tort action against the union. The courts 
and legislatures have developed three standards for imputing the 
violence of pickets to unions: the Norris-La Guardia standard, the 
implied consent test, and respondeat superior. 
The Norris-La Guardia test may protect unions to a degree 
unwarranted by modem economic conditions. Furthermore, this 
protection is imposed by placing a greater burden of proof upon the 
victim who is in need of compensation. In contrast, respondeat 
superior makes the union a bearer of all loss, even though the union 
cannot effectively spread this cost to its members or to consumers. 
The implied consent theory is the most appropriate for imposing 
liability on unions for picket line assaults. Under this test many 
victims obtain compensation, yet unions are still protected from 
responsibility for isolated acts of violence. Moreover, this test is 
easy to administer because of the large body of case law which the 
courts and the National Labor Relations Board have developed in 
applying it. 
-David R. Case 
92 See generally ·A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1960). 
93 See Brandwen, Punitive-Exemplary Damages in Labor Relations Litigation, 29 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 460. 477 (1962). 
